Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
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Publication:683832
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0988-xzbMath1398.91072OpenAlexW2474346721MaRDI QIDQ683832
Sung-Ha Hwang, Jonathan Newton
Publication date: 9 February 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2016/201612-03.pdf
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