Log-linear dynamics and local potential

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.011zbMath1258.91021MaRDI QIDQ417624

Daijiro Okada, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2008-07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selection; stochastic order; stochastic stability; comparison of Markov chains; local potential maximizer; log-linear dynamic; relative log-linear dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

60E15: Inequalities; stochastic orderings

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

60J10: Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces)

91A22: Evolutionary games

91B55: Economic dynamics

Related Items

Log-linear dynamics and local potential, Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games, Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games, Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule, Ordinal potentials in smooth games, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria, Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice, Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets

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