Log-linear dynamics and local potential
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.011zbMATH Open1258.91021OpenAlexW1990903952MaRDI QIDQ417624FDOQ417624
Authors: Daijiro Okada, Olivier Tercieux
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2008-07.pdf
Recommendations
stochastic stabilityequilibrium selectionstochastic ordercomparison of Markov chainslocal potential maximizerlog-linear dynamicrelative log-linear dynamic
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Economic dynamics (91B55)
Cites Work
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- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
Cited In (10)
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- Ordinal potentials in smooth games
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice
- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
- Robust stochastic stability
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- The logit-response dynamics
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