Log-linear dynamics and local potential
From MaRDI portal
Publication:417624
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.011zbMath1258.91021MaRDI QIDQ417624
Daijiro Okada, Olivier Tercieux
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2008-07.pdf
equilibrium selection; stochastic order; stochastic stability; comparison of Markov chains; local potential maximizer; log-linear dynamic; relative log-linear dynamic
60E15: Inequalities; stochastic orderings
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A05: 2-person games
60J10: Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces)
91A22: Evolutionary games
91B55: Economic dynamics
Related Items
Log-linear dynamics and local potential, Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games, Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games, Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule, Ordinal potentials in smooth games, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria, Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice, Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
- Revisiting log-linear learning: asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- Stochastic inequalities on partially ordered spaces
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Potential games
- The logit-response dynamics
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems
- Stochastic Orderings for Markov Processes on Partially Ordered Spaces
- Deciding Linear Inequalities by Computing Loop Residues
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
- Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions