Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.03.001zbMath1229.91214OpenAlexW2139794915MaRDI QIDQ2271379

Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 7 August 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14320/1/MPRA_paper_14320.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

iterationrobustnessequilibrium selectionincomplete informationmonotone potentialperfect foresight dynamicsp-dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (13)

Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games ⋮ Log-linear dynamics and local potential ⋮ Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games ⋮ Strategic complementarities and nested potential games ⋮ On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors

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