Rationalizable foresight dynamics
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Publication:2507679
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3855514 (Why is no real title available?)
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- A model of random matching
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents
- Industrialization under perfect foresight: A world economy with a continuum of countries
- Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
- Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
Cited in
(8)- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Some rationalizability results for dynamic games
- Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics
- ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
- Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
- \(p\)-best response set
- Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: a revisitation
- Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry
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