Rationalizable foresight dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.08.013zbMATH Open1177.91030OpenAlexW2025061683MaRDI QIDQ2507679FDOQ2507679

Authors: Akihiko Matsui, Daisuke Oyama 

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.013

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrationalizabilityperfect foresightrationalizable foresightstability under perfect foresight (PF-stability)stability under rationalizable foresight (RF-stability)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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• Industrialization under perfect foresight: A world economy with a continuum of countries

Cited In (8)

• ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
• Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: a revisitation
• Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics
• \(p\)-best response set
• Some rationalizability results for dynamic games
• Social pressure in networks induces public good provision

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