Social pressure in networks induces public good provision

DOI10.3390/G12010004MaRDI QIDQ2052482zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Jimenez-Gomez

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010004

zbMATH Keywords

contagionpublic goodssocial pressure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Review text

Summary: I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.

Recommendations

• Public goods in networks
• Public goods in directed networks
• Private provision of public goods and information diffusion in social groups
• Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
• Sort out your neighbourhood. Public good games on dynamic networks

Cites work

• An approach to equilibrium selection
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Contagion
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Game theory
• History, expectations, and leadership in the evolution of social norms
• Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On the private provision of public goods on networks
• Rationalizable foresight dynamics
• Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The speed of innovation diffusion in social networks
• Trust and social collateral
• Voting to tell others

Cited in

(5)

• The evolution of networks and local public good provision: a potential approach
• Introduction to the special issue ``pro-sociality and cooperation
• ``Giving in to social pressure
• Social pressure and environmental effects on networks: a path to cooperation
• Public goods in networks

This page was built for publication: Social pressure in networks induces public good provision

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2052482)