Social pressure and environmental effects on networks: a path to cooperation
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Abstract: In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) among themselves and the pay-off matrix of an individual changes according to the number of neighbors that are "vigilant", i.e., how many neighbors watch out for her behavior. In particular, the temptation to defect decreases linearly with the number of vigilant neighbors. This model proved to support cooperation in specific conditions, and here we check its robustness with different topologies, microscopical update rules and initial conditions. By means of many numerical simulations and few theoretical considerations, we find in which situations the vigilance by the others is more effective in favoring cooperative behaviors and when its influence is weaker.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3168330 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple model of global cascades on random networks
- Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
- Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
- Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma
- Scale-Free Networks
- The evolution of cooperation
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