Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
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Publication:1362604
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0555zbMath0882.90133OpenAlexW2100088732MaRDI QIDQ1362604
Publication date: 5 August 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0555
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