Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem

DOI10.1007/s00186-012-0385-6zbMath1258.91070MaRDI QIDQ1935931

Harri Ehtamo, Kimmo Berg

Publication date: 20 February 2013

Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0385-6

zbMATH Keywords

learning; pricing; mechanism design; limited information; buyer-seller game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

Related Items

Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing

Cites Work

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