On the evolution of optimizing behavior

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90042-GzbMath0753.92018MaRDI QIDQ1201144

Suzanne Scotchmer, Eddie Dekel

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamics; learning process; mixed strategies; survival of the fittest; pure strategies; never-fittest strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A80: Applications of game theory

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

Related Items

Evolutionary game dynamics, Learning in games by random sampling, Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria, Imitation and experimentation in changing contests, On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics, Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics, On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia, Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia, Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics, Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining., Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players, Economists' models of learning, The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria, Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Colonial Competitive Algorithm as a Tool for Nash Equilibrium Point Achievement

Cites Work

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