Strategy stability in complex populations

DOI10.2307/3212954zbMath0466.92015OpenAlexW2009308852MaRDI QIDQ3919502

W. G. S. Hines

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3212954

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiescomplex populationsconditional ESSintraspecific conflictsmulticomponent populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Related Items (17)

Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory ⋮ Imitator strategies ⋮ A theory for the evolutionary game ⋮ On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests ⋮ Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space ⋮ Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces ⋮ Reinforcement learning in population games ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations ⋮ An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination ⋮ On the evolution of optimizing behavior ⋮ The ESS for evolutionary matrix games under time constraints and its relationship with the asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space ⋮ Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models ⋮ Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability

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