Reinforcement learning in population games
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Publication:2435889
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.006zbMath1281.91035MaRDI QIDQ2435889
Robert M. Seymour, Ratul Lahkar
Publication date: 21 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.006
91A10: Noncooperative games
92D25: Population dynamics (general)
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A22: Evolutionary games
Related Items
Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution, The dynamics of generalized reinforcement learning, Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium
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