Reinforcement learning in population games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.02.006MaRDI QIDQ2435889zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ratul Lahkar, Robert M. Seymour

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

continuity equationreinforcement learningreplicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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Cited in

(16)

• Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium
• Symmetric equilibrium of multi-agent reinforcement learning in repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game
• Reinforcement learning of heterogeneous private agents in a macroeconomic policy game
• LEARNING, EVOLUTION AND POPULATION DYNAMICS
• Distributed dynamic reinforcement of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation
• The dynamics of generalized reinforcement learning
• REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN MARKOVIAN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
• Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
• Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
• Reinforcement Learning rules in a repeated game
• Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
• LSTEG: an evolutionary game model leveraging deep reinforcement learning for privacy behavior analysis on social networks
• Co-evolution of opinions and behaviors based on conformity in social networks
• Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence
• Learning coordination through new actions

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