Learning purified mixed equilibria

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2581zbMath1032.91010OpenAlexW2072050718MaRDI QIDQ1976442

Drew Fudenberg, Glenn Ellison

Publication date: 24 October 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2581

zbMATH Keywords

learninglocal stabilitymixed equilibriafictitious play model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (17)

The value of a coordination game ⋮ Learning in perturbed asymmetric games ⋮ Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria ⋮ Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets ⋮ Learning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious play ⋮ Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Reinforcement learning in population games ⋮ Fictitious play in 3\(\times \)3 games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour ⋮ Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria ⋮ Learning in games by random sampling ⋮ Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements ⋮ Learning in games with unstable equilibria ⋮ Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory ⋮ Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning ⋮ On (un)knots and dynamics in games ⋮ Entropic penalties in finite games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Consistency and cautious fictitious play
• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
• Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
• Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
• Conditional universal consistency.
• A note on best response dynamics.
• Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• On the Convergence of Fictitious Play

This page was built for publication: Learning purified mixed equilibria