Learning purified mixed equilibria (Q1976442)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1445570
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    Learning purified mixed equilibria
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1445570

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      Learning purified mixed equilibria (English)
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      24 October 2001
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      The authors consider \(3\times 3 \) general sum games and discuss the possibility of obtaining mixed strategy equilibria as a result of a learning process in the style of fictitious play. In the model proposed here a continuum of players numbered 1 and a continuum of players numbered 2 are matched at random to play a fixed strategic-form game with players observing and learning from the aggregate frequencies of each strategy in each population. This paper also analyses the local stability of equilibria in \(3\times 3\) games. See also \textit{V. Krishna} and \textit{T. Sjöström} [Math. Oper. Res. 23, 479-511 (1998; Zbl 1074.91502)].
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      local stability
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      mixed equilibria
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      fictitious play model
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      learning
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