Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2006.10.003MaRDI QIDQ2455679zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William H. Sandholm

Publication date 26 October 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

best response dynamicevolutionary game theoryHarsanyi purification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary stability of pure-strategy equilibria in finite games
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria

Cites work

• A note on best response dynamics.
• Evolution and mixed strategies
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
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• Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Learning purified mixed equilibria
• Matrix Analysis
• Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• Potential games
• Potential games with continuous player sets
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Three characterizations of population strategy stability

Cited in

(15)

• Evolutionary stability of pure-strategy equilibria in finite games
• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• Schelling redux: an evolutionary dynamic model of residential segregation
• The value of a coordination game
• Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Learning in Games
• Evolutionary game theory
• Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
• Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
• The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
• Perturbed Bayesian best response dynamic in continuum games
• Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games
• Conformism across games
• Approachability in population games

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