Learning in Games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3277161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Any Inspection is Manipulable
- Asymptotic calibration
- Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information
- Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
- Bayesian learning, smooth approximate optimal behavior, and convergence to \({\varepsilon}\)-Nash equilibrium
- Beliefs in Repeated Games
- Calibrated forecasting and merging
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Comparative Testing of Experts
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Decision Makers as Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learning
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
- Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
- Game theory
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- Learning by forgetful players
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning to be prepared
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Merging with a set of probability measures: A characterization
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to Nash equilibrium: The almost absolute continuity hypothesis
- Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
- Persistent retracts and preparation
- Preparation
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- Reputation versus social learning
- Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Testing Multiple Forecasters
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The reproducible properties of correct forecasts
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
Cited in
(9)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning and technological progress in dynamic games
- Learning across games
- Learning to game the system
- Learning games
- A behavioral learning process in games
- Mutual learning process model in soft game perspective
- Properties of learning models in collective action: Rationality of backward-looking players
- Learning to win process-control games watching game-masters
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