Learning by forgetful players
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Cited in
(28)- Learning in Games
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Mediated talk: an experiment
- Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
- Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- Learning to be prepared
- Epistemically robust strategy subsets
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
- A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
- Learning, Forgetting, and Sales
- Robustness properties in fictitious-play-type algorithms
- Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
- Clever agents in adaptive learning.
- The cutting power of preparation
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
- Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs
- Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
- Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
- The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
- Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts
- p-best response set
- Regret matching with finite memory
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Stochastic imitation in finite games
- Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games
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