Learning by forgetful players

DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1053MaRDI QIDQ1906716zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sjaak Hurkens

Publication date 24 July 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/815674866ab95b8dbc67773731c1e4a3d3fb8e3d

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic learningminimal curb setsproduct set of pure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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Cited in

(28)

• Learning in Games
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• Mediated talk: an experiment
• Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
• Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Learning to be prepared
• Epistemically robust strategy subsets
• Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
• Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
• A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
• Learning, Forgetting, and Sales
• Robustness properties in fictitious-play-type algorithms
• Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
• Clever agents in adaptive learning.
• The cutting power of preparation
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
• Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs
• Optimality, equilibrium, and curb sets in decision problems without commitment
• Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
• The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
• Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts
• p-best response set
• Regret matching with finite memory
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Stochastic imitation in finite games
• Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games

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