Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
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Publication:4586086
DOI10.3982/TE1405zbMath1395.91054OpenAlexW2166799025MaRDI QIDQ4586086
Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1405
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