Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
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- Almost global convergence to \(p\)-dominant equilibrium
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
- Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Introduction to the theory of differential inclusions
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Learning by forgetful players
- Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
- Learning in experimental \(2\times 2\) games
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games
- Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
- Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- Random matching in adaptive dynamics
- Recursive algorithms, urn processes and chaining number of chain recurrent sets
- Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions
- Stochastic approximations with constant step size and differential inclusions
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The logic of animal conflict
- The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
- p-best response set
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
Cited in
(31)- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Convergence of linear threshold decision-making dynamics in finite heterogeneous populations
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Deciphering chaos in evolutionary games
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior
- Social learning and the shadow of the past
- The generic uniqueness and well-posedness of Nash equilibria for stable population games
- Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibria and Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games
- Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case
- Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
- Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
- Asymptotic stability of robust heteroclinic networks
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Almost global convergence to \(p\)-dominant equilibrium
- Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
- On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games
- Stable biased sampling
- Tempered best response dynamics
- Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
- Adaptive play with spatial sampling.
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
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