Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

DOI10.3390/G6030299MaRDI QIDQ1651806zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan Camilo Cárdenas, César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi

Publication date 10 July 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299

zbMATH Keywords

common pool resource gamesexperimentsquantal response equilibriumsampling equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Experimental studies (91A90) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Review text

Summary: This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(13)

• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Stable biased sampling
• Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stable sampling in repeated games
• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
• An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option
• Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
• Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
• Common pool equities: An arbitrage based non-cooperative solution to the common pool resource problem
• Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics
• The best experienced payoff dynamic in the ultimatum minigame
• Stable mixing in hawk-dove games under best experienced payoff dynamics

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