Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
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Publication:2682006
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Cites work
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Cited in
(9)- On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models
- Computation and verification of contraction metrics for exponentially stable equilibria
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
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- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
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- Stable mixing in hawk-dove games under best experienced payoff dynamics
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