Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
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Publication:2682006
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553zbMath1506.91018OpenAlexW4295981394MaRDI QIDQ2682006
Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo
Publication date: 31 January 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553
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