Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
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Publication:2435891
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.004zbMath1281.91026OpenAlexW2137307267MaRDI QIDQ2435891
Gabriel E. Kreindler, H. Peyton Young
Publication date: 21 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:cc248ae7-49b8-4fb7-8dc8-8692efc15aca
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