Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
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Publication:2681514
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.008OpenAlexW4309769937MaRDI QIDQ2681514
Publication date: 3 February 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.008
statistical inferencebounded rationalitynetwork gamesdeterministic evolutionary game theorysampling best response
Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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