Competing conventions with costly information acquisition

DOI10.3390/g12030053zbMath1485.91026OpenAlexW3174655155MaRDI QIDQ2669073

Roberto Rozzi

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030053

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityevolutioncoordinationconventionscostly information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics

Cites Work

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