Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
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Publication:643287
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.013zbMath1255.91045MaRDI QIDQ643287
Emin Dokumacı, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.013
stochastic stability; large deviations theory; multinomial probit model; discrete choice theory; stochastic evolutionary game theory
60F10: Large deviations
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A22: Evolutionary games
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