Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
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Publication:1651914
DOI10.3390/g9020031zbMath1402.91053OpenAlexW2773741927WikidataQ55899410 ScholiaQ55899410MaRDI QIDQ1651914
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020031
2-person games (91A05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Uses Software
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