Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1651914
DOI10.3390/g9020031zbMath1402.91053OpenAlexW2773741927WikidataQ55899410 ScholiaQ55899410MaRDI QIDQ1651914
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020031
2-person games (91A05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (43)
Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs ⋮ Evolutionary games and matching rules ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Game theory approach to sterile release populations and replicator dynamics: niche fragmentation and resilience ⋮ Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry ⋮ Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation ⋮ Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market ⋮ The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Why is civil conflict path dependent? A cultural explanation ⋮ An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games ⋮ When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation? ⋮ The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition ⋮ Deep and shallow thinking in the long run ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice ⋮ Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice ⋮ Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution ⋮ Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Evolution of cooperation for multiple mutant configurations on all regular graphs with \(N \leq 14\) players ⋮ Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems ⋮ The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types ⋮ Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule ⋮ Prospect dynamics and loss dominance ⋮ Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture ⋮ Agency, potential and contagion ⋮ Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability ⋮ Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Boltzmann distributed replicator dynamics: population games in a microgrid context ⋮ Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection ⋮ Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction ⋮ Evolutionary game research on symmetry of workers' behavior in coal mine enterprises ⋮ Economic harmony -- a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions ⋮ Replicator equations induced by microscopic processes in nonoverlapping population playing bimatrix games ⋮ Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game ⋮ Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism ⋮ Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Markets with heterogeneous beliefs: a necessary and sufficient condition for a trader to vanish
- Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
- On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits
- The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
- Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
- Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
- Tempered best response dynamics
- On the convergence of reinforcement learning
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Potential games
- Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly.
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Optimal properties of stimulus-response learning models.
- Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Learning by forgetful players
- Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
- Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
- A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
- State based potential games
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
- Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration
- Natural selection and social preferences
- From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
- The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
- The logit-response dynamics
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
- Stochastic stability on general state spaces
- What to maximize if you must
- Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- The preferences of homo moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
- The replicator dynamics with \(n\) players and population structure
- Higher order game dynamics
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games
- Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement
- Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
- Evolution of social networks
- The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
- Evolutionary stable stock markets
- Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
- Non-cooperative games
- Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization
- Stochastic coalitional better-response dynamics and stable equilibrium
- Comment on If You're so Smart, Why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
- Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks
- Generalized Efficiency Bounds in Distributed Resource Allocation
- The Bargaining Problem
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- If You're so Smart, why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
- Equilibrium Price Dispersion
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- A new mathematical framework for the study of linkage and selection
- Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Probability with Martingales
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
- Recontracting Stability
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Conventional Contracts
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
- Projected Dynamical Systems in the Formulation, Stability Analysis, and Computation of Fixed-Demand Traffic Network Equilibria
- Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- MARKET SELECTION OF FINANCIAL TRADING STRATEGIES: GLOBAL STABILITY
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- Do Markets Favor Agents able to Make Accurate Predictions?
- THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT AS BLESSING
- Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
- Three steps ahead
- Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior
- Observations on Cooperation
- Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment
- Learning and Model Validation
- Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
- NEWTONIAN MECHANICS AND NASH PLAY
- Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Veiling*
- Joint Strategy Fictitious Play With Inertia for Potential Games
- The Role of Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics in Distributed Control Systems: The Advantages of Evolutionary Game Theory
- Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
- Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning
- The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
- Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments
- Market selection in large economies: A matter of luck
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Distributed Welfare Games
- Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Optimum branchings
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Evolution of Preferences1
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Stochastic Games
- The Calculus of Selfishness
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Introducing to the evolution of preferences
- Preference evolution and reciprocity
- The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences
- Learning in games by random sampling
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A generalization of Hamilton's rule -- love others how much?
- Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
- Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
- Unbeatable imitation
- Competing conventions
- The dynamics of generalized reinforcement learning
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets
- Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
- Evolution of theories of mind
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Stochastic stability in best shot network games
- Revisiting log-linear learning: asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
- Convergence in models with bounded expected relative hazard rates
- Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels
- Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Discretized best-response dynamics for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
- Instability of belief-free equilibria
- Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Evolutionary stability of portfolio rules in incomplete markets
- The asset market game
- Market selection when markets are incomplete
- Market selection and survival of investment strategies
- Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
- Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
- Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
- Imitation with asymmetric memory
- Robustness against indirect invasions
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- A behavioral learning process in games
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Evolution and Kantian morality
- Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
- Evolutionary portfolio selection with liquidity shocks
- Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics
- Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Exponential weight algorithm in continuous time
- How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
- The emergence of rational behavior in the presence of stochastic perturbations
- General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
- Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model
- Learning by trial and error
- The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
- Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
- On evolutionarily stable sets
- Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Assortative mating, selection and mutation models for continuous variation: A reply to Felsenstein
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Evolution and market behavior
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics
- Stochastic approximation algorithms with constant step size whose average is cooperative
- Learning mixed equilibria
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- The weighted majority algorithm
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
- Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Evolutionarily stable sets
- Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate
- Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
- Evolutionary games and matching rules
- Riemannian game dynamics
- Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
- Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
