Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.004zbMath1274.91022MaRDI QIDQ380838

Yakov Babichenko

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp529.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibria; completely uncoupled dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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