Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.004zbMath1274.91022OpenAlexW2055461101MaRDI QIDQ380838

Yakov Babichenko

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp529.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriacompletely uncoupled dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics ⋮ Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games ⋮ Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approximate Nash Equilibria ⋮ Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approximate Nash Equilibria

Cites Work

• Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria
• Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
• How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
• Learning by trial and error
• The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
• Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
• Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium
• Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium

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