Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1413211
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00025-3zbMath1054.91013MaRDI QIDQ1413211
H. Peyton Young, Dean P. Foster
Publication date: 16 November 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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