Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0074-yzbMath1162.91459OpenAlexW2064664401MaRDI QIDQ1022387

James S. Jordan

Publication date: 22 June 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0074-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a locally stable message process
• Locally stable price mechanisms
• Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
• The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
• On the Stability of the Competitive Equilibrium, I
• Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game
• Effective Price Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games

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