The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
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Publication:1165138
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90088-6zbMath0486.90021OpenAlexW1999340677WikidataQ56047188 ScholiaQ56047188MaRDI QIDQ1165138
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54971
informational efficiencyPareto optimal allocationsinformationally decentralized mechanismcompetitive allocation processexchange environments
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