The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0056-0MaRDI QIDQ2500747zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0056-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980852 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(2)

• Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games
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