The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production

DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0056-0zbMath1132.91508OpenAlexW2104504874MaRDI QIDQ2500747

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0056-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Continuous selections. I
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
• Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
• On the informational size of message spaces
• On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes
• On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
• Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
• A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality