On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
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Publication:1131927
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90010-3zbMath0418.90009OpenAlexW1982950138MaRDI QIDQ1131927
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90010-3
general equilibriumpublic goodsWalrasian equilibriumLindahl equilibriumcompetitive allocationsperformance correspondenceoutcome functioncompetitive mechanismeconomies with private goodsNash equilibrium mechanism
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