IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES

DOI10.1111/IERE.12056zbMath1294.91028OpenAlexW2271042317MaRDI QIDQ5420147

Michael Mandler

Publication date: 11 June 2014

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12056

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
• Implementation in differential information economies
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• If You're so Smart, why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Do Markets Favor Agents able to Make Accurate Predictions?
• Fault Tolerant Implementation

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