Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
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Publication:523503
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.010zbMATH Open1409.91031OpenAlexW2586229362MaRDI QIDQ523503FDOQ523503
Authors: Ronald Stauber 
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.010
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Cited In (11)
- Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A strategic product for belief functions
- Strategic irrationality in extensive games
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium in extensive games
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
- Irrationality-proofness: markets versus games
- Ambiguous act equilibria
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
- Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games
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