Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.08.008MaRDI QIDQ629333zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ronald Stauber

Publication date 9 March 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityBayesian gamesKnightian uncertaintyrobustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Robustness to strategic uncertainty
• A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
• Robust equilibria under non-common priors
• Ambiguous act equilibria
• Robust game theory

Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 722611 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3245885 (Why is no real title available?)
• Knightian decision theory. I.
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer
• Real Analysis and Probability
• Representation of subjective preferences under ambiguity
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom

Cited in

(15)

• Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
• Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games
• A note on robust Nash equilibria with uncertainties
• A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
• A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
• Ellsberg games
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
• Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
• Is Kyle's equilibrium model stable?
• Epistemically robust strategy subsets
• Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
• Robustness of equilibrium in the Kyle model of informed speculation

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