Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
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Publication:502330
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.004zbMath1395.91038OpenAlexW3123080389MaRDI QIDQ502330
Linda Sass, Frank Riedel, Igor P. Muraviev
Publication date: 4 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2674088
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