Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
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Publication:502330
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.11.004zbMATH Open1395.91038OpenAlexW3123080389MaRDI QIDQ502330FDOQ502330
Authors: Frank Riedel, Linda Sass, Igor P. Muraviev
Publication date: 4 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2674088
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Cites Work
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- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- Ellsberg games
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Cited In (13)
- On stochastic independence under ambiguity
- Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
- A note on Kuhn's theorem
- Ellsberg games
- The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
- Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
- On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- The theory of extensive form games
- Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
- Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
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