Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
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Cites work
- A note on Kuhn's theorem
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- Ambiguous act equilibria
- Attitude toward imprecise information
- Dynamic choice and nonexpected utility
- Dynamic coherent risk measures
- Ellsberg games
- Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
- Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
- Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
- Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
- Recall in extensive form games
- Recursive multiple-priors.
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential Equilibria
- The right to remain silent
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
Cited in
(13)- Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
- Kuhn's equivalence theorem for games in product form
- The theory of extensive form games
- A note on Kuhn's theorem
- Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
- Ellsberg games
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems
- The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
- On stochastic independence under ambiguity
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