Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
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Publication:405707
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0828-9zbMATH Open1302.91021OpenAlexW3123354864MaRDI QIDQ405707FDOQ405707
Authors: Gaurab Aryal, Ronald Stauber 
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp606.pdf
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Cited In (18)
- Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
- Belief hedges: Measuring ambiguity for all events and all models
- Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
- Equilibrium with strategy-dependent trembles
- A strategic product for belief functions
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- Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
- Ambiguous act equilibria
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
- Subjective probability, confidence, and Bayesian updating
- Trembling-hand myopia and trembling-hand perfection
- The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs
- Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
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