Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
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Publication:1978481
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00089-XzbMath1006.91014MaRDI QIDQ1978481
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A18: Games in extensive form
Related Items
Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information, The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information, Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
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