Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
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DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00089-XzbMATH Open1006.91014OpenAlexW2059353387WikidataQ126843918 ScholiaQ126843918MaRDI QIDQ1978481FDOQ1978481
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00089-x
Recommendations
Cites Work
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Cited In (8)
- Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
- Uncertainty of outcome and varying fan preferences -- a game theoretic approach
- The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
- Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
- Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
- Should I play or should I go? Individuals' characteristics and preference for uncertainty
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