Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90033-GzbMath0721.90084OpenAlexW2082608673MaRDI QIDQ2641229

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90033-g

zbMATH Keywords

rationality iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies robustness of Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (56)

An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium ⋮ Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment ⋮ Rationalizability and logical inference ⋮ Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique ⋮ Equilibrium selection and the restricted game ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ The robust selection of rationalizability ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES ⋮ The reasoning-based expected utility procedure ⋮ Higher order game dynamics ⋮ Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions. ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games ⋮ Possibility and permissibility ⋮ Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability ⋮ Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium ⋮ Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities ⋮ Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games ⋮ Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility ⋮ Dominated strategies and common knowledge ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior ⋮ A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games ⋮ On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations ⋮ An algorithm for proper rationalizability ⋮ A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability ⋮ Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games ⋮ Perfect forward induction ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon's dilemma ⋮ Mutually acceptable courses of action ⋮ Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games ⋮ Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance ⋮ Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance ⋮ The trembling chairman paradox ⋮ Rationalizable trade ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for backward induction

Cites Work

This page was built for publication: Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty