Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
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Publication:2641229
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Cites work
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6009887 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3062450 (Why is no real title available?)
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Sequential Equilibria
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Cited in
(63)- Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon's dilemma
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.
- Rationalizable trade
- Rationalizability and logical inference
- Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
- Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities
- Perfect forward induction
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Equilibrium selection and the restricted game
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability
- The trembling chairman paradox
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
- Weak belief and permissibility
- Iterated elimination procedures
- The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
- Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Higher order game dynamics
- On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games
- The robust selection of rationalizability
- Forward induction equilibrium
- A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
- Corrigendum to ``Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5031690 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- An algorithm for proper rationalizability
- Optimal irrational behavior in continuous time
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES
- The reasoning-based expected utility procedure
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
- Possibility and permissibility
- Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
- Reasoning about your own future mistakes
- Weak* dominance
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
- Self-admissible sets
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