Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
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Publication:1413210
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00543-2zbMATH Open1063.91018OpenAlexW2000548174MaRDI QIDQ1413210FDOQ1413210
Marciano Siniscalchi, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 16 November 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00543-2
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Cited In (20)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach
- On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
- The e-mail game phenomenon
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
- \(p\)-best response set
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Framing the first-price auction
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
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