\(p\)-best response set
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Publication:860346
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001zbMath1142.91345MaRDI QIDQ860346
Publication date: 9 January 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001
risk-dominance; \(p\)-dominance; higher-order uncertainty; perfect foresight dynamics; set-valued concept
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A22: Evolutionary games
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