Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games
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Publication:2496235
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.006zbMath1153.91313MaRDI QIDQ2496235
Publication date: 12 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.006
linear stability; equilibrium selection; risk-dominance; network games; \(p\)-dominance; perfect foresight dynamics; linear incentives; \(u\)-dominance; PIM games
Related Items
\(p\)-best response set, Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
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