p-Dominance and Belief Potential
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Publication:4833991
DOI10.2307/2951700zbMath0827.90138OpenAlexW2244924016MaRDI QIDQ4833991
No author found.
Publication date: 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951700
equilibrium selectionstochastic potentialcommon knowledgerisk-dominancehigher order uncertainty\(p\)-dominance of Nash-equilibriabelief potential of the information systeminfection argument
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