Stochastic stability in a double auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.09.010zbMATH Open1091.91027OpenAlexW3122782713MaRDI QIDQ705852FDOQ705852

Authors: Murali Agastya 

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.010

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionMultiple equilibriaRisk potential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach
• The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
• Price Formation in Single Call Markets
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information

Cited In (8)

• A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
• A steady-state model of the continuous double auction
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• Evolutionary game theory
• BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
• The price of stability of envy-free equilibria in multi-buyer sequential auctions
• Probabilistic properties of the continuous double auction
• Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences

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