BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002200MaRDI QIDQ3395226zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Juana Santamaria-Garcia

Publication date 24 August 2009

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198909002200

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingbest responseconventionlearningstochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Stochastic stability in a double auction
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(2)

• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining

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