A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(29)- Bargaining without commitment
- Delegation and threat in bargaining
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- The policy bargaining model
- Bargaining and strategic demand commitment
- A formal model of firm boundaries and haggling
- Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
- Capacity allocation under downstream competition and bargaining
- Bargaining and waning commitments
- Group bargaining in supply chains
- Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
- Collaborative R\&D and pricing policy of supply chain under the selection behavior of heterogeneous customer
- Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
- Saving costs and improving selling through competitor cooperation in sourcing
- On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims
- BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
- Firm size and pricing policy
- Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
- Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
- Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy
- Bargaining as a struggle between competing attempts at commitment
- Bargaining with revoking costs
- Commitments to threat strategies in Nash bargaining
- Bargaining and negative externalities
- Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
- Final-offer arbitration with reference-dependent preferences
- Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
This page was built for publication: A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1920931)
