Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4145697 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3347963 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
- A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
- A dynamic reinterpretation of Nash bargaining with endogenous threats
- A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Alternating offers bargaining and the golden ratio
- Bargaining with revoking costs
- Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions
- Divide-the-dollar game revisited
- Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
- Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
- Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat
- Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game
- Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games
- Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases
- The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian
- The bargaining problem
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cited in
(5)
This page was built for publication: Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q776859)