A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
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Publication:4271332
DOI10.2307/2938376zbMath0783.90127OpenAlexW1993073641MaRDI QIDQ4271332
Publication date: 9 January 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938376
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