Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00704-1zbMATH Open1448.91031OpenAlexW2999069836WikidataQ126386378 ScholiaQ126386378MaRDI QIDQ776859FDOQ776859
Authors: Shiran Rachmilevitch 
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00704-1
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
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Cited In (5)
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