Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
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Publication:1274183
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00076-7zbMath0926.91003OpenAlexW2136044998WikidataQ127517360 ScholiaQ127517360MaRDI QIDQ1274183
Hans Carlsson, Mattias Ganslandt
Publication date: 12 January 1999
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00076-7
potentialequilibrium selectioncoordinationstrategic uncertaintymedian gamesnoise proofnessnoise-proof equilibriasymmetric coordination games
Related Items (4)
Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Robustness to strategic uncertainty ⋮ An experimental study of costly coordination ⋮ Coordinating under incomplete information
Cites Work
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- An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
- Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
- Potential games
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
- A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
- Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
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