Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00076-7zbMath0926.91003OpenAlexW2136044998WikidataQ127517360 ScholiaQ127517360MaRDI QIDQ1274183

Hans Carlsson, Mattias Ganslandt

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00076-7

zbMATH Keywords

potentialequilibrium selectioncoordinationstrategic uncertaintymedian gamesnoise proofnessnoise-proof equilibriasymmetric coordination games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Robustness to strategic uncertainty ⋮ An experimental study of costly coordination ⋮ Coordinating under incomplete information

Cites Work

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• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
• Potential games
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
• A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games

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