Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
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Publication:2434239
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.006zbMath1284.91067OpenAlexW1996445054MaRDI QIDQ2434239
Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniëls, Frank Heinemann
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2010-008.pdf
Related Items
Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games ⋮ On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games ⋮ Global games with strategic complements and substitutes ⋮ A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
Cites Work
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- Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
- Convexity and well-posed problems
- Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
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- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
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