Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
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Publication:2434239
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.07.006zbMATH Open1284.91067OpenAlexW1996445054MaRDI QIDQ2434239FDOQ2434239
Authors: Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniëls, Frank Heinemann 
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2010-008.pdf
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Cites Work
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
- Convexity and well-posed problems
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
Cited In (14)
- Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
- The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection
- Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
- Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
- Uniform selection in global games
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