Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
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Cites work
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Convexity and well-posed problems
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Every symmetric 3 3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
- Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
Cited in
(14)- Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
- The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection
- Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Every symmetric 3 3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection
- Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
- Uniform selection in global games
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