The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
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Publication:5475055
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00544.xzbMath1141.91352OpenAlexW2115337487MaRDI QIDQ5475055
Peter Ockenfels, Frank Heinemann, Rosemarie Nagel
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00544.x
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